Company failures, design flaws and gaps in oversight contributed to the 2023 Titan submersible disaster that killed all five people on board, according to a final report from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada.
The TSB report, released June 17, 2026, found that OceanGate did not properly validate the carbon fiber cylinder used in Titan’s pressure hull.
Investigators said the submersible’s construction and testing did not follow standard engineering practices. As a result, OceanGate did not know how long the hull could remain safe during repeated dives to Titanic depth.
Titan’s pressure hull was made from a carbon fiber cylinder capped by titanium domes. The TSB said that design was unusual for a deep-ocean, human-occupied submersible.
Deep-sea submersibles are normally made from steel or titanium, and their pressure hulls are often spherical. That shape helps spread extreme pressure more evenly.
TSB laboratory analysis found that reduced compressive strength and defects likely caused Titan’s carbon fiber cylinder to fail slowly over time. Damage built up through repeated dive cycles until the hull finally imploded.
OceanGate had two monitoring systems meant to track the pressure hull’s condition. One measured strain after dives, while another listened for acoustic signs of trouble during a dive.
The TSB found that OceanGate’s strain data review was inconsistent and did not lead the company to remove the hull from service. The acoustic system had not been proven to give enough warning before failure.
During the final dive, that system did not work as intended, according to investigators.
The Titan was descending to the Titanic wreck on June 18, 2023, when contact was lost about 1 hour and 45 minutes into the dive. The wreckage was later found on the ocean floor near the Titanic.
The submersible was owned by U.S.-based OceanGate and supported by the Canadian vessel Polar Prince. The TSB said Transport Canada knew Titan was operating from St. John’s with a Canadian support ship, but Titan received no oversight.
The agency said the case exposed broader gaps in how submersibles are regulated. Its report included six recommendations covering regulatory oversight, technical standards and safety management.
The Canadian findings echo earlier conclusions from the U.S. Coast Guard. In August 2025, the Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation called the loss of Titan preventable.
The U.S. Coast Guard cited OceanGate’s inadequate design, certification, maintenance and inspection process. It also pointed to workplace culture problems and weak domestic and international rules for novel submersibles.
The five people killed were OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush, French Titanic expert Paul-Henri Nargeolet, British adventurer Hamish Harding, Pakistani businessman Shahzada Dawood and Dawood’s 19-year-old son, Suleman.
The final report does not assign civil or criminal liability. The TSB says its role is to improve transportation safety.
Still, the findings describe a chain of missed safeguards. The hull was not properly validated, monitoring systems did not prevent the final dive, and regulators did not step in before the disaster.
For the families of the five victims, the report offers a clearer explanation of what failed. It also raises a larger question for deep-sea exploration: who is responsible for making sure experimental vessels are safe before people are allowed inside?